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Abstract—The fifth generation (5G) technological leap has
arrived, bringing with it promises of incredible data rates
and never before seen precision in location accuracy. However
this self-same precision carries with it the significant question:
how will it be protected? These questions form the underlying
motivation for this article where we examine 5G architecture
which employs a radio access part commonly termed a cloud
or centralized radio access network (C-RAN). The C-RAN cen-
tralizes higher-level physical layer processes while keeping low-
level processes distributed throughout the physical network.
We show how this architecture both increases location-based
privacy through improved physical-layer security, but creates
new privacy concerns via the extension of the radio access
network through fronthauls connecting data transfer among
low and high-level processing. Concurrently, the proposed 5G
variable subcarrier spacing further exacerbates the former
point. Through simulation we quantify the decrease in location
privacy given the aforementioned considerations. It is shown
that location privacy is inversely proportional to subcarrier
spacing for user equipment (UE) connected to multiple 5G
access points. Specifically, for a (UE) using the widest allowable
subcarrier spacing location privacy drops to approximately
three meters.
1. Introduction
Digital-age privacy is a major source of conflicting ide-
als within society today. Discussions abound in academia,
industry, government, pop-culture, etc., going further to
postulate whether privacy has lost most of its original mean-
ing [1]–[3]. Within the amalgam of issues that make up
privacy, there is none with more polarizing opinions than
location privacy. Location-based services (LBS), originally
an optional feature in cellular networks [4], have arguably
become an essential part of daily life, from easing travel
and deconflicting schedules, to personalization of marketing,
sales, and habit formulation. However, with increased pre-
cision, and access to a user’s location, comes a proportional
decline of the user’s privacy [5].
5G has become the next fundamental milestone in wire-
less communications, which will redefine the way we in-
teract with the world around us [6]. Intelligent highways
and traffic systems, self-driving vehicles, Internet of Things
(IoT), Internet of Skills (IoS); all will require highly effi-
cient, accurate, and, in some cases, continuous positioning
information to be complemented by exceedingly location-
aware devices. The shift from Long Term Evolution (LTE)
to 5G promises to bring millions more connected devices
online with location accuracy predicted down to less than a
meter [7] resulting in a significant loss in the end user’s
privacy. To explain, we define privacy generally as the
condition of being free from observation by others, where,
in this case, the observation of concern is the user’s loca-
tion. As the precision with which location aware devices
and network-based localization increases, the user’s level
of privacy around their location proportionally decreases,
thus a loss in privacy. The common trend in society is that
this loss of privacy in exchange for the utility provided by
LBS, is generally not concerning [8]. We argue the contrary.
The exactness of the data, combined with the number of
authorized 3rd party groups that will have access to it via
applications utilizing LBS already carries the inherent risk of
interception by unknown and unauthorized parties. We will
show that this risk is exacerbated by the current conceptual
design of the 5G network.
The main contribution of this paper is to show to what
degree the 5G ultra-dense centralized/cloud radio access
network (C-RAN) architectural design is vulnerable to a
location-based attack through geometric analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 compares and contrasts work related to this inves-
tigation. Section 3 presents an overview of the C-RAN 5G
architecture and reasons for use in this paper. In Section 4,
the timing advance (TA) is introduced along with its utility
within the 5G network protocol. Section 5 presents our
attack model. Section 6 states the structure of our simulation
environment. Section 7 reports the numerical results of our
simulated statistical studies along with our interpretations. In
Section 8, we present strategies for mitigating location vul-
nerabilities within the aforementioned constraints. Finally,
we will make our concluding remarks in Section 9.
2. Previous Work
Methods for localization of user equipment (UE) within
the network environment have been a paramount objective
for network operators following the 1996 Federal Com-





Figure 1: Example of trilateration in a standard LTE archi-
tecture.
munications Commission (FCC) mandate for standardized
accuracy requirements during enhanced 911 calls [9]. These
mandates were revised multiple times and now call for 50
meter or 100 meter location accuracy for 67% of calls and
150 meter or 300 meter accuracy for 90% of calls in an
outdoor environment utilizing mobile or network-based so-
lutions, respectively [9]. By 2015, 50 meter horizontal and 3
meter vertical three-dimensional (3D) accuracy requirements
are named for calls made indoor [10]. Localization mandates
have had far reaching effects on the scope and use of an
individual’s location data, and continue to set the pace for
industry standards.
Five fundamental positioning techniques using radio
signals are trilateration, triangulation, proximity, scene-
analysis, and hybrid [4]. For this investigation we will
focus entirely on the scope of work surrounding trilateration.
Trilateration or, more generally, multilateration computes a
position solution based on the intersection between com-
mon geometric structures created by distance measurements
(Time of Arrival (ToA), Received Signal Strength (RSS),
etc.) between the UE and the reference transmitter/receiver,
as shown in Figure 1. To meet regulatory requirements,
operators have done extensive research on both mobile
and network-based trilateration techniques. Focusing on
network-based solutions, trilateration has been shown in a
real deployment as a valid method for achieving previously
dictated positioning accuracy [11].
3. C-RAN Architecture
5G promises ultra-low latency (ULL), high capacity,
cost effective, and more environmentally friendly commu-
nications. In order to realize these demanding aspirations,
the way in which the network is structured must be over-
hauled. To this ideal, the C-RAN architecture was born.
The differences between the legacy radio access network
(RAN) and this next-generation framework reside in two
categories: network re-structuring, and fronthaul/backhaul
interface updates.
3.1. Network Re-structuring
The 5G C-RAN, as depicted in Figure 2 scheme is
comprised of Baseband Unit (BBU) pools, which consist of
numerous, centrally located BBUs. Each pool is distributed
across different geographical regions and connected via the
fronthaul network to potentially thousands of Remote Radio
Heads (RRHs) that are densely aggregated close to UEs.
These BBU pools are then connected through the midhaul
and backhaul network to the next stage of aggregation and
the mobile core network. Network connections have had
multiple physical layer proposals [12], however for this we
will assume a standard fiber deployment.
This centralized structuring of the network, differs
greatly from the traditional RAN where both the BBU
and RRH are deployed together as the base station. The
C-RAN framework results in greater resource efficiency and
sharing, and a decrease in capital expenditures (CapEx) and
operational expenditures (OpEx) [13]. It also paves the way
for the end game realization of the 5G virtualized network
functions (VNF), or cloud architecture, which will allow
for advanced network management techniques like network
slicing or on demand functionality for updated or novel
deployments.
Figure 2: Example of C-RAN Architecture
3.2. Interface Update and Replacement
The fronthaul network of the C-RAN as characterized
by LTE, uses common public radio interface (CPRI), an
industry cooperation. CPRI establishes the key, physically
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Figure 3: Proposed Physical Layer Splits [14]
separate portions of the traditional base station, defined as
the radio equipment control (REC) and radio equipment
(RE), which correspond to and are referred to throughout as
BBU and RRH, respectively [15]. The BBU encompasses
the digital baseband radio functions, while the RRH carries
out analog radio frequency tasks. This allows for the spatial
separation as defined previously. CPRI links, which make-
up the fronthaul, are fiber connections that transport the
digitized radio frequency signals between the RRH and
BBU [16]. Though this legacy interface offers savings in
cost per RRH, it would also require a dramatic increase in
capacity required primarily due to the targeted data rate and
massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) configura-
tion. The interested reader will find the calculation of the
required fiber capacity detailed in [17], which reports 147.5
Gbps for a particular network scheme, while [18] reports
236 Gbps for another. Along with these values being difficult
to attain in real-world deployments, another disadvantage is
that these capacity requirements are fixed regardless of the
actual network traffic volume, which belies the promised
efficiency of the network. To find the balance between
capacity, latency, and network customizability, the concept
of functionally splitting the layer protocols was introduced.
Figure 3 depicts the physical layer split (PLS) architecture as
defined by 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) [14].
All functions to the left of a split lie with the BBU, while
those to the right lie with the RRH.
Currently, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics En-
gineers (IEEE), 5G Infrastructure Public-Private Partnership
(5GPPP), 3GPP, and the CPRI group are all working to
develop a novel fronthaul, based on this PLS architecture.
The CPRI group’s answer to this call is the enhanced CPRI
(eCPRI). This interface bases its PLS off of an option 7/2
fronthaul/backhaul, in which all radio link control (RLC)
and media access control (MAC) layer functions are held
at the BBU, lower physical layer functions, such as mod-
ulation, fast Fourier transform, and resource-mapping are
delegated to the RRH [19]. The BBU then sends data to the
remainder of the backhaul utilizing UDP, IP, and Ethernet
protocols.
We assume for our network an option 7 split in ac-
cordance with the eCPRI structure and current industry
opinion [20], [21].
4. Timing Management in 5G
The 4G and 5G TA command is used to ensure time-
domain synchronization between the UE and the RRHs.
Additionally, the TA command is unencrypted and therefore
does not guarantee confidentiality. Previously, in LTE, each
incremental TA, NTA, had a pre-determined time value that
depends on LTE’s base unit of time, Ts. Furthermore, Ts
depends on the static subcarrier spacing (SCS) LTE employs
(15 kHz) [22]. The Ts value is defined as
Ts = 1
∆fref ×Nf,ref = 115 × 103 × 2048 ≈ 32.6 nsec.
Each incremental TA accounts for 16 of these base units
of time such that
NTA = 16Ts.
This time unit earns its relevance as companies and
users continue to leverage LTE infrastructure during the
slow offramp towards 5G [23]. Finally, the legacy one-way




where c is the speed of light in meters per second [24]. Fi-
nally, the distance resolution represented by each TA in LTE
is 78.125 m, corresponding to 5G’s smallest SCS. However,
5G New Radio is expected to employ new, dynamic SCS
values termed “numerologies” [23], [25]. Therefore, a new
base unit of time, Tc, has been introduced in [25] which 5G
new radio will employ, such that
Tc = 1
∆fmax ×Nf = 1480 × 103 × 4096 ≈ .51 nsec.
Thus, relating the two base time units between the stan-





TABLE 1: µ and it’s corresponding one-way TA distance
resolution.









Therefore, in 5G’s new scheme, each incremental TA value
represents an uplink (UL) transmission time delay or trans-




Where the 2µ factor accounts for the subcarrier spacing. In
other words, NTA is conditional upon SCS designated by
the value of µ. The new SCS are multiples of the LTE SCS
where the new SCS = 2µ × 15 kHz for µ ∈ [0,4] [26].
Thus, the new distance resolutions are determined simi-









In 5G, the TA distance resolution is variable and con-
ditional upon µ. Table 1 summarizes the new distance
resolutions.
4.1. Timing Advance Group
The Timing Advance Group (TAG) [27] is a 2-bit field
that uniquely associates each TA command with a different
RRH, up to 4. The mechanism’s usefulness stems from that
fact when the UE communicates with multiple RRHs, it is
very unlikely that the UE will be equidistant from all the
servicing RRHs simultaneously. The benefit of communi-
cating with multiple RRHs is that it increases bandwidth
and data rates to and from the UE. Carrier aggregation en-
ables the UE to transmit using multiple component carriers
simultaneously [28]. Therefore, in order to maintain timing
synchronization with each of the RRHs, the TAG associates
when the UE should correctly transmit its uplink to the
RRH in order to maintain time synchronization with each
RRH [29].
Despite the foregone conclusion for multilaterations apt
use as a localization technique, utilizing TAs within the
traditional LTE framework as a valid method for localization
is sparse within the literature. Only in the last few years have
researchers shown through simulations and analysis of real-
world data, the efficacy of this type of attack, employing
the same multilateration method [30]. Our analysis of the
effectiveness of the TA within the 5G ultra-dense C-RAN
environment complements these previous endeavors, as well
as supports the need for further scrutiny of and regard for
the user’s location privacy.
5. Attack Framework
As stated above, this exploit uses multilateration through
the TA units associated with the victim, to perform what
is known as a localization attack [14]. In a legacy LTE
network, the adversary could position themselves in a way
to collect the most amount of information on a target of
interest through the open-air interface. Due to the ultra-
densification, tight beamforming, large antenna arrays, and
use of massive MIMO that makes up the 5G network, this
paradigm is made ineffective. However, the aforementioned
layer 2 information still undesirably travels unencrypted
through the wired fronthaul, only shifting the location of
the vulnerability in the network. This framework carries
multiple inherent assumptions on adversarial capabilities
that are as follows:
1) general knowledge of which BBU pool is servicing the
victim,
2) the ability to tap into the fronthaul fiber, and
3) knowledge of the cell-radio network temporary identi-
fier (C-RNTI).
With these assumptions established our adversary has ev-
erything required to run our algorithm and be supplied with
a most likely estimate of the victim’s current position, as
demonstrated in the following section.
6. Simulation Environment
Initially, we used a Poisson point process to distribute
the RRHs around the target UE. However, since location
accuracy is solely a function of the relative angular geom-
etry between the RRHs, we then decided that an arbitrary
field density is more appropriate. Therefore, we uniformly
distributed either 2, 3, or 4 RRHs in a two dimensional space
surrounding the target UE. Generating a larger subset of the
infinite process was unnecessary to only then sort them by
distance to the UE and finally choose the closest RRHs.
Therefore, two main parameters are considered through
this investigation. They are the number of RRHs the UE
is communicating with and the numerology (i.e., SCS or
symbol duration). We have chosen to limit the number of
RRHs communicating with the UE to either 2, 3, or 4,
which can be supported by the use of the TAGs. According
to [23] the numerology varies between 15kHz and 240kHz
depending on the BW allocation.
Then, we send each of the 10 possible combinations of
supporting RRHs and numerology through our simulation.
First, we create a 100,000 km2 area in which to place
our RRHs. Then, we modelled the locations of the RRHs
as a uniform random variable and placed them within our
simulated testing area. Next, we calculated the TA value that
was assigned to the UE from each RRH. For example, if the
UE were communicating with 3 RRHs then there would be
3 separate TA values, each associated with its own RRH.
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Because the TA value is unique for range of distances,
there is an aspect of uncertainty that is introduced. The
RRH does not know whether the UE is on the fringe of
a TA range, or in the center of a TA ring. In LTE, each TA
corresponds to a distance of 78.125 meters from one TA to
the next. However, with the largest numerology in 5G, the
TA values have shrunk the area of uncertainty (i.e., TA ring
width) to 4.88 meters. Thus the TA resolution will be much
more accurate and the ability for a RRH to localize a UE
has increased significantly.
Now that we have the associated TA with each of the
supporting RRHs, we are effectively able to draw rings with
a width equal to the distance resolution around each of the
RRHs. These rings are the area of uncertainty and account
for all of the possible locations of the UE. Clearly, the
UE would be contained within, or on the boundary of, the
intersection of all the TA rings. In order to estimate the
position of the UE p we employed the Non-Linear Least
Squares (NLS) method presented in [31] and [32]. Briefly,
that involves us minimizing the value of x in the following
p = arg min
x
N∑
i=1 [di − ∥x − xi∥]2
where di is the distance from each RRH to the middle of its
respective TA ring. The variable i is an integer value from 1
to N , which is representative of the total number of RRHs
supporting the target UE. Lastly, xi are the locations of the
RRHs themselves.
We normalize the position of the UE to be in the center
of the plane of possible RRHs locations. We know that this
same center point must be contained within the area that
represents the points containing all the possible locations
of the UE, so that is where we had the NLS algorithm
start looking for the UE. In other words, we had the NLS
algorithm beginning at the position of the UE, and then
measure how far the algorithm diverges from that point,
once it stabilizes.
Then, once the NLS algorithm converged on a location,
we computed the distance error (i.e. the distance between
the UE and the NLS solution.) After simulating one million
trials for each of the 15 aforementioned combinations, we
generated their respective cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) to better compare the performance results. The
respective CDFs are a graphical representation of the likeli-
hood that the position of the targeted user is within a specific
distance of the position estimate. For example, using the
CDF, one could make a statement that there is an 90%
chance that the user is located within 5 meters of a certain
position.
Lastly, for simplicity in presenting the argument, this
model assumes perfect noise conditions. In real-world sce-
narios the results would likely be less accurate. Noise con-
ditions are ignored here in order to highlight the specific
effect of SCS on distance resolution and localization.










0 15 168.72 317.46
1 30 85.41 165.71
2 60 42.98 84.42
3 120 21.50 42.48
4 240 10.75 21.36










0 15 56.29 78.57
1 30 28.21 39.33
2 60 14.14 19.71
3 120 7.06 9.85
4 240 3.53 4.92










0 15 41.18 49.12
1 30 20.57 24.61
2 60 10.29 12.27
3 120 5.14 6.14
4 240 2.57 3.08
7. Results
As one might expect the scenarios where there are more
RRHs yielded better results. In this case, there is more infor-
mation to use regarding the location of the UE. Additionally,
as the numerology increases, so too did the accuracy of
the location estimate. We have tabulated the 90% and 95%
location error (i.e., circular error probability (CEP)) values
for each of the RRH scenarios in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Of
note, in the case with 3 RRH, the 95% CEP coincide
with the TA distance resolutions for each numerology. This
could simply be because it includes the majority of position
estimates while discarding outliers, however further research
is ongoing.
When comparing the values between Tables 4 and 5,
we have an average performance increase from 3RRHs
to 4RRHs of 27.1% at the 90% confidence level and a
37.5% increase in performance at the 95% confidence level,
regardless of numerology. That is because as the numerol-
ogy increases, it effectively halves the area of uncertainty.
Therefore, the effect is the same across all numerologies.
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Figure 4: 3 RRH CDFs across all numerologies. (n=1 mil-
lion).
Additionally, we can see that the incremental trend from
one numerology to next is akin to halving the location error.
This outcome is likely due to the same reasons that there is
constant performance increase from 2 to 3 RRHs, and 3 to
4 RRHs. This observation holds for all cases of the number
of RRHs at both confidence levels.
The most accurate location estimation scenario occurs
in the situation with 4 RRHs supporting the UE, all of
which are transmitting with the largest numerology. Here,
one could localize the UE to within 2.57 meters with 90%
confidence and to within 3.1 meters with 95% confidence.
However, if you lose one RRH, the 90% confidence error
expands to 3.53 m and the 95% confidence error grows to
4.92 m. Therefore, we must take a closer look at the less-
than-favorable scenarios where we have fewer RRHs and a
lower numerology. Using the LTE numerology (i.e. µ = 0)
and just 3 RRHs increases the 95% confidence error to 78.5
meters.
There is a significant performance increase when going
from 2 RRHs to either 3 or 4 RRHs. Consider a TA circle
defined by the midpoint between the TA rings, and centered
at the location of the RRH. Then, in the 2 RRH case, the
NLS algorithm will always find the TA circles’ intersection
point closest to the target UE, when it exists. Thus, the
accuracy is mostly a function of the relative position of the
two RRHs. At the 90% confidence level, we have an average
performance increase of 67% when using 3 RRHs instead
of 2, and a 75.95% increase when using 4 RRHs instead of
2. And at the 95% confidence level, we have performance
increases of 76.4% and 85.3%, respectively. In other words,
using 4 RRHs vice 2, reduces the 95% confidence area of
uncertainty by 85.3%. Therefore, in either case, we have
dramatic performance increases just by adding even a single
extra RRH. Again, we observe the halving of the confidence
location error with each incremental increase in µ.
In Figures 6, 7, and 8, we depict the CEP [33] for six
Figure 5: 4 RRH CDFs across all numerologies. (n=1 mil-
lion).
Figure 6: 2 RRH CDFs across all numerologies. (n=1 mil-
lion).
different cases. The CEP1 is a tool used for showing the
use of location distance error and the confidence location
error [34]. The six different cases are the combinations
between 2, 3, or 4 RRHs used and the lowest and highest nu-
merologies. Thus, in each case of the number of RRHs, we
shows the highest and lowest fidelity of distance error. The
blue markers in each image are the estimated position of the
targeted UE over 1,000 trials. 1,000 was chosen arbitrarily
to be used for demonstration purposes. In fact, the authors
used one million trials to generate the previously described
CDFs. The targeted users actual position is normalized to
the centered of the graph and is depicted as a red asterisk.
Finally, the red rings indicate the area with which we can
confidently say that the target UE is within. In each of the
presented examples, roughly 90% of all the estimates points
1CEP 70%: Pr[∥pˆ − p∥2 < C] = 0.7
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90% CEP with 2 RRH ( =4)
Figure 7: 90% Circular Error Probability (CEP) using 2
RRH with numerologies µ = 0 and µ = 4.
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90% CEP with 3 RRH ( =4)
Figure 8: 90% Circular Error Probability (CEP) using 3
RRH with numerologies µ = 0 and µ = 4.
fall withing the CEP. Therefore, the smaller the circle, the
more accurate of a location estimate. The radius of the
rings can be extracted from the corresponding rows and
columns Tables 2, 3, and 4 above. For example, the radius
of the circle in the right graph of Figure 8 is 2.57 meters,
which corresponds to µ = 4 and 90% confidence in Table
4. At first glance, it may appear that all of the scenarios
generate the same results. However, the distinction between
them manifests itself in the horizontal and vertical axes. In
order to avoid overcrowding of points within the graphs,
the authors chose to separate the instances by numerology,
as well as the number of RRHs. Additionally, we felt it
necessary to rescale the graphs. Otherwise, the distinction
between points within, and outside of, the circles may be
lost.
-50 0 50


















90% CEP with 4 RRH ( =0)
-5 0 5


















90% CEP with 4 RRH ( =4)
Figure 9: 90% Circular Error Probability (CEP) using 3
RRH with numerologies µ = 0 and µ = 4.
8. Recommended Mitigation Techniques
This attack is entirely reliant on two basic ideas:
1) Data being transferred from RRH to BBU is not en-
crypted in the form of in-phase and quadrature (I/Q)
data.
2) C-RAN fronthaul fiber network
This is where we will focus our mitigation efforts. The first
requirement has a seemingly easy solution. If the PLS option
is altered to include Layer 2 functionality at the RRH, then
eCPRI’s built in security measures already associated with
IP, IPsec, and Ethernet, MACsec, could be implemented
when sending the data across the fiber fronthaul. This mea-
sure carries an added benefit in that it further reduces the
capacity requirement of the fiber fronthaul. However, this
added complexity at the RRH will have an adverse affect
on cost and complexity of network deployments, which will
in turn increase cost for the end user, dispelling support for
this option.
5G’s lauded physical layer security potential through
heterogenous networks, massive MIMO, directionality
through beamforming, and larger antenna arrays, are made
inefective by the overall C-RAN structure. The layer of
security provided by these methods, no longer matter if all
the data from thousands of RRHs in an area are being routed
to a single centralized source. There would be no need to
attempt the rigors of overcoming these security methods, if
the fiber fronthaul can be collected on. This is to say that
without the first mitigation in place, or a verifiable way to
stop adversaries from collecting the data within the fiber
fronthaul, the C-RAN architecture itself presents a security
concern.
9. Conclusion
Aggregating TA information, as is the case using a C-
RAN architecture, could present a possible location privacy
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vulnerability. Here, we’ve shown that it is possible to local-
ize a user should an actor compromise the 5G infrastructure
and gain access to that user’s metadata. Moreover, the more
information a user has, as in the cases with more RRHs,
combined with the increased SCS, allows for ever greater
localization resolution. Therefore, as 5G networks slowly
start to come online, the technologies it employs could
lead to ever more accurate user location data. Finally, we
presented some mitigation methods to prevent against such
an attack.
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